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ABSTRACT:
Since the 1970's, the field of forensic economics has grown considerably into a major
sub-field within the greater discipline of economics. However, the growing demand for
forensic economists, coupled with the rapid growth of financial compensation for
forensic economists, has fueled concerns about the effect this expansion is having on the
overall tone of economic debate, the individual behavior of forensic economists, and the
ethical credibility of economics as a whole. Through the use of an illustrative case study,
this paper synthesizes the current discussion regarding the lack of ethical standards in
forensic economics while evaluating various proposals that have been put forth to restore
confidence and credibility within forensic economics. The case study demonstrates that
serious shortfalls still exist in regards to comprehensive ethical standards to guide
forensic economists and ultimately highlights the need for continued research into the
issue to find a suitable standard.

I. Introduction
When compared to most other academic disciplines, the field of economics is still
very young. Before the relatively modem idea of using self-interest to guide economic
activity there was simply no reason for economic study. Economic decisions were guided
by tradition and force. However, after the widespread abolition of such conventions, the
study of economics has grown rapidly and it is now being combined with other
disciplines and applied in many areas previously ignored. One of the new sub-categories
within economics is forensic economics, also referred to as litigation economics. Forensic
economics involves using science, more specifically economic research, to establish facts
in a legal setting. Ever since the 1970’s, the use of forensic economists as expert
witnesses and consultants has grown rapidly (Tinari 1993). These economists have been
used in various types of cases, but the most visible type of cases are tort cases. In tort
cases, economists are used to help calculate economic damages in cases involving
wrongful deaths, debilitating injuries, and the like. A positive shift in the demand curve
for forensic economists also came about in the 1990’s which was driven by a rash of
mergers, acquisitions, and industry deregulations (Mandel 1999). Recent years have seen
a growing concern among economists about the effect that the increasing propensity for
academic economists to engage in litigation support is having on the overall tone of
economic debate, the individual behavior of forensic economists, and the ethical
credibility of economics as a whole (Mandel 1999).
In this paper, I will be discussing thU*concerns surrounding forensic economics.
Specifically, I will discuss forensic economists' incentives to engage in unethical
behavior as they involve themselves in an adversarial legal system where financial stakes
W
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are often very high for the parties involved. Some of the anecdotal stories of unethical

w
behavior currently swirling through the discourse include deliberate skewing of opinions,
misrepresentation of study results, inflated claims of statistical certainty, and practicing
other tactics that give an unwarranted advantage to clients. A recent article in the journal
Telecommunications Policy has brought to light a possible case of unethical behavior
among economists, in conjunction with other expert consultants, working for regulated
telecommunications companies who are dealing with the requirements of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.1 will use this telecom article as an illustrative case
study with which to discuss the issues economists face when engaged in litigation support
and relate it to the wider struggle to establish an ethical standard within forensic
economics. Research in this area is in its early stages and it is mostly presented in the
main public forum for such information, The Journal o f Forensic Economics. This is a
peer-reviewed publication that is maintained by the National Association of Forensic
Economists (NAFE), a member organization of economists who engage in litigation
support. Section III ties in some of the analysis that has been published in The Journal
which is highlighted by the telecom article. Section IV discusses the pros and cons of the
various solutions to the dilemma of imposing ethical standards on forensic economists.

II. Misuse of the modified t test in telecommunications
On February 8, 1996, President Bill Clinton signed into law the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, thus bringing about a new era in telecommunications
policy (President 1996). At the time of its passing, government and industry advocates of
the legislation talked of the new world it would spawn in the telecommunications

-2-

industry; a world of lower prices, increased competition, and seamless integration of
various telecommunications networks (Economides 1998). However, most of the
provisions of the act had never been implemented before, especially on such a large scale
(Crandall 2005). Furthermore, the act itself is very ambiguous in its provisions. Although
many advocates of the legislation were already celebrating the act before it had even been
ratified, very few had actually taken the time to read the text of the act in its entirety. It
did not take much time after the passing of the Telecom Act for the realization to occur
that few people agreed on what the provisions meant or how they should be interpreted
and implemented (Furchtgott-Roth 2006). The ambiguity and widespread disagreement
over the provisions within the Telecom Act proved to be the catalyst for extensive
litigation over the Federal Communication Commission’s (FCC) attempt at implementing
the various parts of the legislation.
One major goal of the Telecom Act is its attempt to introduce competition into
regional U.S. local telephone service markets (Opdyke 2004). Prior to the Telecom Act,
local and long distance telephone markets were separated by law. Telephone service
carriers who provided long distance service were prohibited from offering local service
and carriers who provided local service were prohibited from providing long distance
service (Swann and Loomis 2005). The Telecom Act ended this restriction, sort of.
Section 253 (a) of the Telecom Act states “No State or local statute or regulations, or
other State or local requirement, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability
of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service" (Wiley
an Wadlow 1996). It seems that this statement ends all artificial barriers to entry in the
telephony industry. However, the act contains more than one-hundred pages of detailed
W
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instructions to regulators and prescriptions for opening local telephony markets. In order
for local telephone service providers, known as regional Bell operating companies
(RBOC), to enter the long distance markets, they have to prove they are in compliance
with the fourteen-point competitive checklist in section 271 (c) (2) (B) of the Telecom
Act (Huber, Kellogg, and Thome 1996). Essentially, the RBOCs are required to prove
that they have facilitated competition in their local service markets by allowing their
competitors to interconnect with their network and by also providing their competitors
with service that is at least equal in quality to the service they provide their own
customers (Crandall 2005).
The major challenge of these requirements is determining what constitutes service
of equal quality and how exactly that equality can be tested and verified. The quality of
service is actually composed of hundreds of performance metrics that are measured and
recorded by the various RBOCs. These metrics, sometimes referred to as operations
support services, include operations like how fast a phone line is installed, how fast a line
is repaired, how often repairs are made within a promised time frame, etc (Opdyke 2004).
Sometimes, factors beyond the RBOC’s control, like weather or natural disasters, may
affect the service level they provide to their competitors. This can result in variability
within the data which is distinct from the potential variability of measurement error.
Hence, a need came about for a way in which to establish whether or not RBOCs were
providing service to their competitors that was at least equal to that of their customers as
specified by the Telecom Act. Logical reasoning led to the utilization of a statistical test,
since statistical testing is designed to determine, with a certain specified level of
certainty, whether or not differences within data are due to random chance or true

differences within the data population as represented by the data sample (Opdyke 2004).
However, the choice of statistical tests provided the foundation for controversy and
allegations of intentional bias.
Years of statistical and economic research has led to the development of
numerous statistical tests, each designed for a specific set of conditions and
circumstances. Perhaps the most important factor to consider when choosing a statistical
test is figuring out what hypotheses will be tested. The null and alternate hypothesis must
cover the entire sample space and be mutually exclusive. Improper use of a statistical test
can lead to skewed results. In a 2004 article in the journal Telecommunications Policy.
J.D. Opdyke claims that the statistical test advocated to test service parity, that was
advocated by both the RBOCs and their competitors, and approved by regulators, was
inappropriate and inconsistent with the hypotheses that are implied by the Telecom Act
(2004). The text of the Telecom Act requires RBOCs to provide service that is at least
equal to that of their own customers. Therefore, the null hypothesis should be accepted
only if the RBOCs have provided equal (or faster) average service AND equal (or less)
variability in service. The alternative hypothesis, when properly defined, is accepted if
only one or both of these conditions are not true (Opdkye 2004). An increase in service
variability alone, even if average service is equal or better, is sufficient to claim disparity
according to the terms of the Telecom Act. However, the statistical test that was adopted
to test service parity, known as a both the modified t and modified Z test, was designed
for “studies where there is a biological basis (e.g., toxicological studies) for expecting a
treatment effect on mean response to be accompanied by an increase in variance
(emphasis authors’)” (Brownie, Boos, Hughes-Oliver 1990, 259). This means that both
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conditions in the alternative hypothesis would have to be true to accept it. This slight
alteration in the alternate hypothesis has the potential to affect the results of the parity
testing necessitated by the Telecom Act. Opdyke asserts that the modified t statistic, in
direct contradiction to the claims of the industry, has the potential to encourage ‘gaming’,
or allowing RBOCs to provide service to its competitors that is, on average, equal to that
of its own customers but subject to greater variability (2004). In essence, the potential
exists for RBOCs to provide unequal service to their competitors, but not have the
violation detected by the statistical parity test, which is a violatioi^of the Telecom Act.

III. Analysis
Many questions arise from this apparent misapplication of a statistical test. Why
was the use of the modified t test advocated in the first place? Who advocated it? Who
benefits from its application? Why did the regulators accept it? Trying to find answers to
these questions leads into the current debate among economists about the proper role and
the professional responsibilities of economists who involve themselves in litigation
support.
Take the question of who first advocated the use of the modified t statistic. The
idea of using the modified t statistic for parity testing was first put forth by a
conglomerate of RBOC competitors, called the Local Competition Users Group (LCUG),
on February 6, 1998. The membership of the group consisted of AT&T, Sprint, MCI,
LCI, and WorldCom (Local Competition Users Group 1998). Expert testimony, solicited
from both the RBOCs and their competitors, supported the use of the modified t statistic
in parity testing. Trying to ascertain who those experts were and how many of them were
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economists, or advised by

economists, is very difficult. This highlights the first

important issue within forensic economics: how much litigation support are economists
actually engaged in? Much of the current discussion on bias among economists focuses
on courtroom testimony (Tinari 1993). It is not exactly easy, but certainly possible to find
records of courtroom testimony given by forensic economists. The bigger and more
widely know the case is, like the Microsoft antitrust suit, the more likely testimony is
publicly available and easy to access. Once obtained, the testimony can then be compared
with the economist's academic current academic research for inconsistencies. Under these
circumstances, bias and unethical behavior among forensic economists is easier to detect.
Furthermore, when an economist actually testifies and attempts to advantage their client
by introducing bias into their testimony, the potential exists for an experienced and
knowledgeable attorney to bring the economist's bias to the attention of the court through
rigorous cross-examination and have the economist's testimony disallowed.
However, courtroom testimony is actually a small fraction of economists overall
contribution to litigation support. Most of the work they do involves writing briefs and
various other written analytical reports, many of which are not easily accessible or
inaccessible to the public (Tinari 1993). Furthermore, when economists are engaged in
providing economic strategies for private companies engaged in regulatory matters, like
the LCUG and its advocacy of the modified t statistic, the chances of the economist’s
consulting work of facing any sort of peer review or public scrutiny are essentially nil.
Unless the economist reveals the work they did on behalf of a company, the integrity of
the work may never be known.
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The second major issue concerning ethics within forensic economics is trying to
determine who is paying economists to provide their expertise. In the case of the
modified t statistic, it is almost certain that the RBOCs and their competitors hired
economists to provide support during regulatory hearings, but it is not publicly known
how much the economic consultants were paid for their services or how many were
involved in the case. The idea that large-scale monetary incentives can change some
people's behavior is a rather uncontroversial assumption, especially among economists. It
is now becoming evident that the monetary incentives for forensic economists are
growing very large indeed. It is hard to quantify exactly how big the industry for
economic consulting work is in America. One attempt, made in 1997, estimated the
revenues for expert economic consultants to be $300 million for the year (Mandel 1999).
Documentation of economists changing their conclusions to satisfy a client who pays
generously is hard to come by, and it is dangerous to make such an assertion of that kind
of behavior without adequate proof. However, some of the concern comes from the fact
that lawyers seem to have no trouble finding economists who are interested in the
lucrative opportunities in economic consulting and litigation support. Currently, there is
little to guide economists in this newfound opportunity. Theoretically, an economist
could, over time, provide litigation support for clients on both sides of a dispute. Due to
the complex and contestable nature of most economic problems, an economist could offer
to provide litigation support to whichever side offered to pay her more for her services.
Furthermore, if an economist engaged in litigation support slightly skews some of her
conclusions to satisfy a wealthy client, by minimizing assumptions, or implying a
conclusion has a higher level of certainty than the research supports, due to the current
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anonymity of economic consultants, there is little potential for negative consequences for
the economist. There is currently insufficient evidence to know if forensic economists
involved in advocating the modified t statistic were swayed by money into supporting a
misguided application of a statistical test. The possible profits for RBOCs and their
competitors created by the Telecom Act's provisions allowing them to enter each others
markets were huge. With so much at stake, it is not implausible to think that the
telephone service carriers spent a descent amount of money to secure experts who would
most robustly support the conclusion that had the greatest profit potential for the carriers,
regardless of the scientific merits of using the modified t test for parity testing.
Trying to figure out who benefits from the use of the modified t statistic leads into
the question of why it was advocated in the first place. To attempt to answer these
questions, I must first touch on the nature of bias within economic consulting and
litigation support. Within current discussion among forensic economists, two forms of
behavior are cited again and again as the main types of unethical behavior. The first is
participation in litigation support when one is unaware of the methodology or not updated
on current developments within forensic economics. The second kind of behavior is
purposeful manipulation of the result to arrive at a favorable conclusion (Sattler 1991). It
seems more likely that the case of the modified t statistic was an example of the second
kind of behavior. There is circumstantial evidence that points toward willful manipulation
and the advocacy of the modified t test. Uncovering it requires a consideration of the
incentives for both the RBOCs and their competitors to advocate for implementation of
an inappropriate statistical test to measure parity.
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As I mentioned above, the Telecom Act tore down all previous barriers
prohibiting RBOCs from entering long distance markets and prohibiting competitive
challenge to the RBOCs for the local service markets. While the profit potential from this
attempt at competition in telephone service are huge, the potential negative consequences
of the RBOCs being found in violation of the Telecom Act's competitive checklist
requirements, or providing unequal service to their competitors, are huge as well. The
most overt threat of penalty the RBOCs have to worry about is monetary fines. If the
RBOCs are found to be providing disparate service to their competitors, they have to pay
fines, sometimes in the millions of dollars, to those competitors and in some cases to the
government (Opdyke 2004). If a RBOC is found to be consistently violating the terms of
the Telecom Act, permission to enter the long distance service market may be
permanently revoked by regulators (Opdyke 2004). Revocation is not only bad for the
RBOC, it is bad for its competitors as well. Should a RBOC be disallowed to enter the
long distance service market, it no longer has an incentive to facilitate competition in its
own market and its competitor's loose out on the potential profit opportunities of gaining
access to the RBOC's local service market. In addition, findings of disparity, with their
potential for RBOC fines and other restrictions, could cause a loss of investor confidence
in the industry which in turn could cause creditors to lower the industry's bond and stock
ratings, creating an impediment to the industry's ability to raise capital. These major
threats to the health of the telephony industry that come from findings of disparity create
an incentive for the all the players in the industry, not just the RBOCs, to support a
statistical test that will result in as few findings of disparity as possible. In this case, if
willful manipulation did take place, it might not have been just a ploy for reaping higher
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profits but also an attempt to shield a rapidly changing industry from running afoul of the
terms of the Telecom Act.
The question then becomes if this test is not the best test, and has the potential to
allow RBOCs to violate the Telecom Act's provision of equal service, why did the
regulators approve it in the first place. After all, the regulatory agencies have skilled
professionals working for them which include economists, statisticians, and other support
staff. Why the regulatory board gave this test approval remains a mystery. Opdyke's
article refers to the approval as a "glaring oversight" on the part of the regulators (2004).
This is certainly possible. The differences in the modified t test and statistical tests that
Opdyke puts forth as more appropriate for the hypotheses to be tested are slight and
possible to overlook at first glance, although presumably not for skilled professionals.
Perhaps when the LCUG first proposed the use of the modified t test, their argument was
so cogent it satisfied or impressed the regulators enough that normal levels of scrutiny
were not applied. Or perhaps the regulators were influenced by the tendency of
bureaucrats to protect their position. Hypothetically speaking, if a situation came about
where consistent findings of disparity led to fines, sanctions and a loss of confidence in
the industry, scrutiny might become focused on the regulators and their management of
the industry. Regulators seem to have an incentive of their own to prevent findings of
disparity as much as possible. While it is interesting to speculate on the possible reasons
as to why the regulators accepted the modified t test, another more troubling question that
is raised by this case, which is reflective of a larger issue debated within forensic
economics, is why has the use of the modified t test has been reaffirmed by numerous
court rulings and orders by regulatory bodies.
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This is another mystery. It is not impossible to accept the idea that regulators
made a mistake when they first approved the modified t test. (We could also assume that
the LCUG made a mistake in advocating the modified t test.) However, if we assume that
regulators did not recognize that the modified t test was inappropriate for the
circumstance and its potential to allow gaming by RBOCs when they approved it, logical
reasoning suggests that somewhere down the line another, more scrupulous regulatory
body, who was not a party to the original decision to approve usage of the modified t test,
would recognize the weaknesses of the modified t test and attempt to implement another
statistical test that was more suited to the hypotheses. One possible impediment to such a
correction might be a convention within American legal philosophy. The American legal
process is adversarial, not scientific. The main focus for all involved in the legal process
is to win the case, not necessarily advance research or contribute to the academic debate
surrounding an issue. Once an issue is decided, like the acceptance of the modified t
statistic for parity testing, it becomes a legal precedent and gains an inertia that makes it
hard to reverse or overturn. This legal doctrine, known as stare decisis, maintains that
once a legal precedent is set it will not be overturned unless there is good cause to do so
(Gilbert 1997). What constitutes good cause is debatable, however, the tendency within
the American legal system is to more often than not let legal rulings stand rather than
overturn them. This tendency to let rulings stand also influences the regulatory process.
This may be part of the reason as to why the modified t test is still being used for parity
testing in the telecommunications regulation.
There is another issue that is also in play for economists who are involved in any
form of litigation support: credibility. One of the most important characteristics for an

w

-

12

-

economist to have, or be perceived to have, in order to gain employment as an expert
witness is credibility (Sattler 1991). Experts who lack credibility are deemed to be of
little use to attorneys and clients. However, what constitutes credibility in the world of
academic economics is something entirely different from what constitutes credibility in a
legal setting. Academic economists are supposed to be open to new ideas. Academic
economics is similar to other sciences in the respect that when and academic economist's
ideas and conclusions that she had previously generated are contradicted by new ideas
that are better supported by the facts, to maintain credibility among her peers she should
accept and adopt the new ideas (Mandel 1999). The goal in academic economics is the
pursuit of the truth and those who are willing to consider and adopt new ideas that are
better supported by the facts gain credibility in the field as an honest and open scientist.
However, in the legal field, credibility is judged by consistency (Sattler 1991). If an
W

expert puts forth an opinion on a subject and later changes her opinion, she opens herself
for attack by the opposition. A recent example of this happened during the Microsoft
antitrust case. When Richard Schmalensee was testifying on behalf of Microsoft, he was
attacked by the prosecution for contradictions between his testimony and an article he
had written in 1982 (Mandel 1999). Economists who regularly engage in litigation
support may find it hard to resist the tendency to lock oneself into an opinion, lest they be
subject to allegations on inconsistency and ultimately lacking credibility. The incentive is
very strong to avoid losing credibility as it is widely seen to be the most important factor,
even more so than having the greatest knowledge of the matter at hand (Stufflebean
1991). Regulatory bodies may also be subject to the same conundrum. In the modified t
case, a regulatory body that decided to revoke approval of the modified t test for parity
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testing could open itself up to charges of inconsistency amongst regulators and an overall
loss of credibility. Opdyke speaks to this in his article when he says "An optimistic view
would hold that such open-minded recognition by commissions would allow relevant,
applied empirical and analytical research that is new and original, yet rigorously tested
and thoroughly documented, to disabuse the industry of the inappropriate statistical
practices it refutes, in spite of legal inertia supporting them..." (2004, 856). Optimistic
seems to be the key qualifier in this quote, since the modified t test is still in use nearly a
decade after it was first proposed. An emerging negative externality of litigation support
for academic economists is a chilling of debate around economic issues, both among
economists who are engaged in litigation support and those who wish to participate in
litigation support.

IV. Suggestions for future research
While these problems have begun to become topics of debate within forensic
economics, the discussion has predictably begun to look toward possible solutions. The
most widely circulated and promoted solution is an industry-wide code of ethics. Some
suggest this would be a good first step toward establishing forensic economics as a
formalized profession. Other professions, like law and medicine, have long-standing
codes of ethics which have governed their respective members (Piette 1991). It has been
noted by famed judge and scholar Richard Posner that codes of ethics often develop out
of industry self-interest. They create a sense of cooperation among professionals to make
sure the public interest is served and avoid many of the side-effects caused by more
restrictive measures like registration, certification, and licensing (Posner 1974). The
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NAFE already has a code in place that governs its members. However, many economists
who engage in litigation support are not members of the NAFE and thus not bound by
any formalized ethical considerations. The NAFE code has been suggested as a possible
starting point for a potential industry-wide code of ethics. The elements that would
constitute a code of ethics do not seem to be of great dispute among the industry. It is of
general agreement that a code should reflect such values as equality of opportunity,
privacy, protection from injury, and self determination. Furthermore, it is generally
agreed that a code of ethics be specific and honest, neutral, regulative, and enforceable
(Piette 1991). The concept of enforceability is the only issue that is of substantial
contention. There is disagreement as to whether or not a code of ethics within forensic
economics should be binding or not. Many other professions with codes of ethics, like
law and medicine, require practitioners to be licensed or registered according to
prescribed means. However, talk of similar requirements is quite controversial among
forensic economists. As can be expected, most free-market economists are very leery of
restrictions on the competitive market for any good or service, including the services of
forensic economists. It has been noted by many detractors of these measures that
professions that require registration or licensing rarely discipline members for not
adhering to the code of ethics (Piette 1991). Concern has also been raised as to the
possible membership of a licensing board and who would control that board. Licensing
and registration boards for other professions are often staffed with political appointees
who, over time, begin to restrict membership for reasons outside of serving the public
interest (Depperschmidt 1994). Additional layers of bureaucracy, in the form of ethics
committees, may also have to be created to adjudicate disputes if a binding code of ethics
w
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is implemented. Similar concerns as those raised about licensing board membership have
been raised about the membership of ethics committees. A non-binding ethics code seems
much more likely to gain acceptance among forensic economists. Although it would be
unenforceable in the formal sense, it could provide a reference point for colleagues,
lawyers, and society to judge the behavior of forensic economists. Hence, a non-binding
code of ethics would be enforced by social controls.
Another possible remedy to some alleged bias within forensic economics is some
organizational measure that requires economists engaged in litigation support to disclose
their past involvement in litigation support. This could include such facts as who they
have worked for, what their contribution to specific cases was, and how much they have
been paid for their consulting services. A measure requiring such transparency would
quell many of the concerns currently plaguing the industry. However, such a requirement
is likely to be opposed by some forensic economists on the grounds that it violates the
privacy rights. However, there may be ways to force forensic economists reveal
information regarding their previous litigation consulting work without formal
requirements. An organization, such as the NAFE, could take on as part of its mission to
create an educatory group that trains members of the legal profession on how to craft
more and better questions that can be used in a legal setting to challenge expert
economics witnesses and consultants, thereby exposing past instances of unethical
behavior on the part of a forensic economist. In this sense, forensic economists could take
a greater share of the responsibility of policing their own ranks; a responsibility that
currently rests entirely on the legal profession (Johnson 1991).
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Another idea that has received little attention is creating a process to register
w
qualified forensic economists, in a similar fashion to that of arbiters, and assign members
to cases on a rotating and regional basis. If the services of a forensic economist are
requested, one would be chosen from the registry and assigned to the case (Tinari 1993).
This is a provocative idea that could go a long way toward eliminating incentives among
forensic economists to bias there testimony because of the pressures of the legal process.
Forensic economists would not know who they were being hired by and their pay would
not be dependent on giving favorable testimony for one side or the other, but rather
presenting sound information backed by economic research. However, many possible
problems could arise from attempts to implement this idea. For example, the
aforementioned concerns about the politicization of the membership of an organization
that operates such a registry would apply. Furthermore, issues of compensation and
w

funding under such a plan are left unresolved. If such a registry was implemented would
there be limits on the compensation a forensic economist could get? Would all
participants receive the same pay? Who would fund the organization maintaining the
registry? Although I think this idea holds the most promise, many hurdles would have to
be overcome in its implementation and in the grand scheme of things it may not be able
to overcome the ideals of American capitalism and individualism, which to some ardent
free-marketers are violated by this form of government intervention.
Another idea, that is not a topic in current discussion, is the establishment of a
nationwide clearinghouse for information regarding forensic economists. Such an
institution could have regional offices that collect as much information as possible about
economists' involvement in the legal process, whether it is in the public or private sector,
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torts or regulated industries. Such a system would reduce the costs of evaluating the
performance of forensic economists. The NAFE has been attempting to collect
information regarding allegations of bias and unethical behavior among forensic
economists for the past couple of years, but so far they have not made public any of their
findings and the process is taking place out of the public eye. The more forensic
economists work to not only police themselves, but show the public that they are working
to maintain ethical standards within their own ranks, the greater the public's trust and the
legal establishment's trust in them will be. While the NAFE's effort to document cases is
applaudable, the secretive nature of the process does little to combat growing allegations
of unethical behavior among some forensic economists.

V. Conclusion
As economics continues to develop, its uses and applications will only grow. This
fact is evidenced by the integration of economics into many older and well established
disciplines. The new and exciting field of forensic economics is a prime example. The
use of economists as expert witnesses, which began in the 1970's, is becoming more
widespread with each passing year. Unfortunately, some concern has sprung up among
the ranks of economists and outside observers as to the effect that this new career
opportunity is having on the behavior of economists and the profession as a whole. The
huge financial stakes of many legal cases, coupled with the narrow focus on success
within the legal industry, has created concern about the integrity of a discipline that was
once known as a disinterested science whose main pursuit was the finding truth through
rigorous research and scholarly debate. Incentives for forensic economists to engage in
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unethical behavior are growing and a call for measures to counter these incentives is
growing as well. As the case of the modified t statistic demonstrates, manipulation can
and does take place. However, the case also demonstrates the many shortfalls of the
current system of controls (or lack thereof) on forensic economists. It is nearly impossible
to gain access to the information to find out when unethical behavior has been committed
by a forensic economist, who that economist is, and whether or not that behavior was
intentional. While some research into the issue is currently being done by the NAFE,
much more needs to be done if forensic economics is going to end speculation regarding
member misconduct and establish itself as a true and cohesive profession. Furthermore,
the NAFE and other concerned parties need to focus more on economists' litigation
support which takes place behind the scenes, including in the regulated industries. Until a
more comprehensive and public approach is taken to this problem, it will continue to
x^/
burden the field of forensic economics. This paper is an attempt to synthesize the
research that has been bom our of current discussion surrounding ethics in forensic
economics while examining some suggestions for remedies of the issue of imposing
ethical standards on forensic economists. The lack of available research into this problem
mandates that more be done to make sure the best possible solutions are found and the
field of forensic economics achieves the status and credibility that it deserves.

\^ /

-19-

Works Cited

w Brownie, Cavell, Boos, Dennis, Jacqueline Hughes-Oliver. 1990. Modifying the t and
ANOVA F Tests When Treatment Is Expected to Increase Variability Relative to
Controls. Biometrics 46.1: 259-266.
Crandall, Robert. 2005. Competition and Chaos: U.S. Telecommunications since the
1996 Telecom Act. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
Depperschmidt, Thomas. 1994. Ethics in Forensic Economics: Evidence and Remedy
Issues. Journal o f Forensic Economics 7.2: 159-169.
Economides, Nicholas. 1998. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and its Impact. NYU
Center for Law and Business (September).
Furchtgott-Roth, Harold. 2006. A Tough Act to Follow? The Telecommunications Act o f
1996 and the Separation o f Powers. Washington D.C.: The AEI Press.
Gilbert Law Summaries. 1997. Law Dictionary. Orlando: Harcourt Brace Legal and
Professional Publications, Inc.
Huber, Peter, Kellogg, Michael, and John Thome. 1996. The Telecommunications Act o f
1996. New York: Little, Brown and Company.
Johnson, Walter. 1991. Qualifications, Ethics and Professional Responsibility in Forensic
Economics. Journal o f Forensic Economics 4.3: 277-285.
Local Competition Users Group. 1998. Statistical Tests for Local Service Parity.
Version 1.0.
Mandel, Michael. 1999. Going for the Gold: Economists as Expert Witnesses. Journal o f
Economic Perspectives 13.2 (Spring): 113-120.
Opdyke, J.D. 2004. Misuse of the ‘modified’ t statistic in regulatory telecommunications.
Telecommunications Policy 28.1: 821-866.
Piette, Michael. 1991. Code of Professional Ethics for Forensic Economists: Problems
and Prospects. Journal o f Forensic Economics 4.3: 269-276.
Posner, Richard. 1974. Theories of Economic Regulation. Bell Journal o f Economics and
Management Science 5: 330-338.
President William J. Clinton, Remarks by the President at the Signing Ceremony for the
Telecommunications Act Conference Report. 1996. Transcript available
http://www.itsdocs.fhwa.dot.gOv//JPODOCS/SPEECH/22Q01!.PDF.
Sattler, Edward. 1991. Economists, Ethics, and the Marketplace. Journal o f Forensic
Economics 4.3: 263-268.
Stufflebean, Debra Guiou. 1991. The Expert Witness: Knowledge and Communication
(The Deadly or Dynamic Duo). Journal o f Forensic Economics 4.3: 317-327.
Swann, Christopher and David Loomis. 2005. Competition in Local
Telecommunications: There’s more competition that you think. Business
Economics 40.2: 18-28.
Tinari, Frank. 1993. Competition for Forensic Economists and Their Ethical Behavior.
Journal o f Forensic Economics 6.3: 263-269.
Wiley, Richard and R. Clark Wadlow. 1996. The Telecommunications Act o f 1996. New
York: Practicing Law Institute.

V

-

20

-

